Iranian history begins in 1979 for most of us. It’s as if the country didn’t exist before the Iranian revolution, the overrunning of the U.S. Embassy and the taking of 52 American hostages. That incident thrust Iran into the consciousness of the American public (and, arguably, led to the electoral defeat of Jimmy Carter by Ronald Reagan in the November, 1979, national election, the first of the Republican minority governments [in terms of popular vote] leading to the ascendency of Mr. Trump).
Our mental shorthand (mine included) wants to simplify our perception of other countries and groups. We are trained to think of Iranians as rabid Shiite Muslims directed by a Muslim theocratic leader, the Grand Ayatollah, but the reality of the people of Iran is far, far more complex. The history of Iran over the last century has been a struggle between groups that favor a pluralistic, constitutionalist, relatively democratic government and those favoring power concentrated in a monarchy or religious monarchy (theocracy). Meanwhile, the British, the Russians, and the U.S. have intervened–and NOT in support of pluralistic, popular, and constitutional government. For example, the “Persian Constitutional Revolution” occurring between 1905 and 1909, mostly among the merchant class, briefly established an elected Iranian Parliament under a constitution. That fell apart under Russian and British intervention, the British abandoning the Constitutionalists in favor of a Shah, much like Trump recently abandoned the Kurds to the Russians and the Turks.
Fast forward to 1953. I highly recommend you read the article “64 Years Later, CIA Finally Releases Details of Iranian Coup.” It helped cure me of my U.S.-made historic myopia. The article appeared in June, 2017, edition of Foreign Policy (among the least biased of news sources). In 1953 our Central Intelligence Agency ignited a revolution in Iran that brought down Iranian Prime Minister Muhammad Mossadegh and brought back the Iranian monarchy under Shah Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, the monarch who had gone into exile during the turmoil of the Abadan Crisis, the nationalization of Iranian oil by the post World War II Iranian Parliament (the Majlis).
Prime Minister Mossadegh had served as PM for only two years, elected to that position overwhelmingly (79 to 12) by the Majlis. The nationalization of Iranian oil “was enormously popular and seen [by the Iranians] as a long overdue staunching of the bleeding of its national wealth [to the British[, which could now be harnessed to fighting poverty in Iran.” Mossadegh was:
An author, administrator, lawyer and prominent parliamentarian, his administration introduced a range of social and political measures such as social security, land reforms and higher taxes including the introduction of taxation of the rent on land. His government’s most significant policy, however, was the nationalization of the Iranian oil industry, which had been built by the British on Persian lands since 1913 through the Anglo-Persian Oil Company (APOC/AIOC) (later British Petroleum and BP).[6]
Essentially, we and the British meddled with a representative government moving in the direction of reforms, but threatening British Petroleum. This CIA intervention is, for many Iranians, conservative and liberal alike, the historic point they revisit when they think of the USA. (Aside: Yes, I know that 1953 was a different era. We were just coming out of WWII. Senator Joseph McCarthy was fueling fear of communism. We were more worried about our oil supply than currently. But none of that changes what Iranians justifiably think of the United States either now or at the time of the Iranian Revolution in 1979.) Our undermining of the relatively democratic 1953 government of Iran is far better remembered in Iran than it is here. For the people of Iran our government is inextricably linked to 1953 and the CIA intervention.
The outcome of a revolution is often not foreseen by its participants. The 1979 Revolution in Iran was made possible by an alliance of disparate elements that opposed the Shah. Some of them longed for the democratic, populist reforms of Mossadegh, some were fanatical Muslim Fundamentalists. (It is impossible to know the percentages. There are no polls of which I’m aware. There are only anecdotes, interviews and impressions.) It is likely many Iranians were somewhere in between in their opinions (rather like today’s disaffected, non-voting “independents” in our country). Some Iranians expected Ayatollah Khomeini to return from exile simply as a spiritual figurehead, ensconced in Qom, something like a Shiite Papacy, rather than a religious/political leader who would consolidate power as a theocratic despot claiming justification in scripture. Instead, Shiite Fundamentalists had superior organization and planning that led to their takeover in the aftermath. (This laying of the groundwork for revolution chillingly reminds me of the groundwork laid by Matt Shea, his “Christian” Nationalists, and the insular preparation of the American Redoubt).
How we tend to think about present day Iran depends on our mental picture of Iranians. The section titled Aftermath in the wikipedia article “Iranian Revolution” offers some idea of the social complexity at the time of the revolution. The insights from that period also shed some light on the reports of Iranians taking to the streets recently, first against the government, then to condemn th U.S. and mourn Qassim Suleimani, and then to protest against the government after 176 civilians were mistakenly killed by a missile attack on a Ukrainian airliner in the wake of the Suleimani assassination. (Lest we feel too smug over the latter protests, we would do well to remember the 290 civilians who died in 1988 on Iran Air Flight 655, shot down in error by a missile from the USS Vincennes. When people armed to the teeth stand with fingers on triggers and feeling nervous, bad things happen.)
Iran and its people have a complicated history with the United States, a history we would do well to remember. As in the U.S., the Iranian government does not speak for all of its people. Both countries are subject to some degree of nationalistic fervor when aroused by a perceived threat. Both countries are subject to political and religious polarization. The governments of both countries engage in propaganda and repression of dissent. The difference is a matter of method and degree.
Keep to the high ground,
Jerry
P.S. “Iran” tends to pop up a mental image for most of us (including me) of a monarchical Shiite Muslim Fundamentalist Ayatollah wearing a turban and a robe, as if that were the proper portrait of the average Iranian. The Ayatollah Ruhollah Khomeini, the Iranian leader at the time of the hostage taking, the Ayatollah who returned from exile to theocratic power with the Iranian Revolution, died ten years later, in 1989. Khomeini was succeeded by “Supreme Leader” Khamenei, the man who remains as the head of the Iranian Shiite Muslim Fundamentalist theocracy. Khamenei’s hegemony is challenged by robust and recurring protests–by people who mostly don’t wear turbans and robes.
P.P.S. Trump focused on our (and his?) myopic perception of Iranian history as beginning in 1979 with his war crimes tweet: “We targeted 52 Iranian sites (representing the 52 American hostages taken by Iran many years ago), some at a very high level & important to Iran & the Iranian culture, and those targets, and Iran itself, WILL BE HIT VERY FAST AND VERY HARD.” With that tweet Trump was guaranteed to fire up Iranian nationalism even among those critical of the current theocracy–and certainly among the many who remember 1953.